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1   Introduction 
In this paper we argue that many German labor regulations and legal practices that 
enforce these regulations can best be understood as devices to suppress 
competition on the labor market supply-side to the maximum possible extent. The 
so-called Flächentarifsystem or "area tariff system" (henceforth: ATS) consists of 
a single industry union and one employers’ association which represents the vast 
majority of the firms in the industry. Both parties determine the wages and overall 
employment conditions by signing an area tariff agreement (Flächentarifvertrag).
While these tariff contracts are formally binding only for all employees employed 
by the member firms of the employer’s association, their coverage typically 
extends to almost all employees in the industry.
1
Germany’s labor laws and institutions do not only encourage unionization and 
collective bargaining, but the "one-union" principle has been realized in Germany 
so that uncontested union monopoly power and industry-wide tariff agreements 
are the rule. This sharply contrasts with many other countries where the 
cartelization effects of such labor legislation are confined to an individual 
employer’s premises so that industry-wide collective bargaining is rather 
exceptional (for seminal cartel analyses of the US labor laws, see CHAMBERLIN
[1963] and POSNER [1984]). 
As our cartel analysis reveals, significant parts of the German labor institutions 
serve to facilitate the cartelization of the entire labor supply within the hand of a 
single industry union, both by discouraging employers and employees to exit the 
cartel and by combating outsider competition at the individual and the collective 
contracting level.
2
This kind of extreme pro-monopoly orientation of the German labor law stands 
in sharp contrast to widely acknowledged antitrust principles which serve to 
ensure competitive structures and efficiency in other markets, even though the 
1 Due to space constraints, we will not analyze recent developments towards a more 
segmented labor market in Germany, following the liberalization of the law on 
employment agencies (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz) in 2003. Now the principle of 
equal working conditions (Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz) does not apply anymore if the 
employment agency or the respective employers’ association concludes a new collective 
sector contract (Branchentarifvertrag). Indeed, a small number of such collective 
contracts have now been concluded, not only with the monopoly unions of the Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), but also with the unions of its (only) rival, the Christlicher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (CGB). For a preliminary study of this very recent phenomenon, see 
ANTONI AND JAHN [2006a], [2006b]. 
2 The realization of the one-union principle was a problem in the service sector where 
industry evolution and market liberalization increasingly blurred the boundaries between 
service branches. Difficulties in clearly delineating union competencies led to the largest 
union merger in post-war German history when in March 2001 the five service sector 
unions (namely, the Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft (DAG), the Deutsche
Postgewerkschaft (DPG), the Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen (HBV), 
the Industriegewerkschaft Medien, Druck und Papier, Publizistik und Kunst (IG Medien), 
and the Gewerkschaft Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV)) merged to 
form one union Verdi; at that time, the largest sector union of the Western World with 
roughly three million members. 5
effects of cartelization are quite similar in both the labor market and "ordinary” 
other markets: Cartels raise prices above competitive levels.
3 As a consequence, 
supply becomes rationed which is – in labor market terms – equivalent to 
persistent unemployment. And indeed, Germany’s unemployment rate 
consistently ranges at the top among the industrialized economies. According to 
EUROSTAT [2006], the unemployment rate for July 2006 has been 8.2% in 
Germany, while it has come down to 3–5% in many other countries like the US, 
the Netherlands, or Denmark to provide some examples.
4
However, while cartels usually have to be self-enforcing and, therefore, must 
rely on some (often imperfect) sort of market-based enforcement mechanism, the 
German labor cartel does not suffer from such incentive problems. In fact, our 
cartel analysis reveals that the German labor law, and complementary legal 
practices, have yarned a dense net of institutional stabilizers around the ATS. As a 
consequence, and in sharp contrast to more conventional product market cartels, 
the ATS has been surprisingly stable since its emergence after World War II.  
The main objective in this paper is to apply standard cartel theory to identify 
the major institutional stabilizers of the German labor cartel. Our cartel analysis 
allows us to demonstrate that recent labor policy measures that intend to make 
labor markets more "flexible” further serve to stabilize the labor cartel while other 
pro-competitive proposals (which have misleadingly been framed as "flexibility" 
measures) have not been implemented. We argue that the latter pro-competitive 
recommendations have failed exactly because of their destabilizing effects. 
Finally, we propose measures for injecting competition into Germany’s labor 
markets. Such an endeavor must, however, go hand in hand with the 
institutionalization of a competition policy framework for labor market disputes as 
any destabilizing policy inevitably provokes counter measures of the incumbent 
monopoly unions so as to protect their dominance vis-à-vis outsider competition. 
Without an institutional framework that allows for a balanced reasoning between 
pro-union objectives and antitrust concerns, any policy aiming for a more 
decentralized governance of employment relationships is doomed to fail. As a 
consequence, we propose drastic institutional changes in the legal environment 
which are more conducive to a rule of reason approach and which stand in sharp 
contrast to the current approach that is per se pro-monopoly oriented. 
3 Prices above competitive levels reduce social welfare under fairly general conditions. 
Some economists and industrial sociologists, among others, have developed several 
"efficiency" arguments in favor of labor cartelization and related stabilizing labor laws, as 
e.g., dismissal protection laws (for summaries of those undertakings, see e.g., MÜLLER-
JENTSCH [1983], [1986], DEREGULIERUNGSKOMMISSION [1991], BERTHOLD AND HANK 
[1999], or ENGEL [2000] which focus on the debate in Germany, and POSNER [1984] 
which summarizes the debate in the US). 
4 The true unemployment rate in Germany is in fact much larger. For example, the 
German Council of Economic Advisors has consistently reported a hidden unemployment 
of around 1.2 million persons (see SACHVERSTÄNDIGENRAT [2006, p. 130]). BACH AND
SPITZNAGEL [2003, p. 7, Table 1] even report 1.7 million people in hidden unemployment 
and 1.0 million people participating in governmental work programs, and these numbers 
still tend to underestimate the true extent of unemployment in Germany, as the extensive 
use of early retirement programs is not taken into account. 6
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
overview over the ATS before section 3 reconciles the cartel analysis of the 
German labor market. Section 4 analyzes the effects of recent labor reform 
proposals and discusses various elements for a working competition order for the 
labor market. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2   Collective Wage Bargaining in Germany 
In Germany, wage tariff profiles and overall work conditions are, for the 
overwhelming majority of all workers, (still) negotiated on a bilateral basis 
between industry unions and the according industry employers’ associations (see 
KOHAUT AND SCHNABEL [2007]). In principle, the resulting area tariff contracts 
serve as a minimum standard for all employees in a given region under the so-
called area tariff system (ATS). The centralized ATS is complemented with firm-
level agreements which regulate the detailed employment of workers at their 
workplaces.
5
While the percentage of employees covered under the ATS has been declining 
by 9.4 percent in West Germany and by 10.8 percent in East Germany between 
1995 and 2000 and even further until 2006 (see KOHAUT AND SCHNABEL [2003a], 
[2007]), the overwhelming majority of blue-collar employees is still paid wages 
equal to or even higher than the wages negotiated at the centralized level, even 
though more and more firms have been "escaping” from the collective agreements 
by leaving their employers’ associations, especially in East Germany (see 
KOHAUT AND SCHNABEL [2003b], [2007]). In general though, competition still 
plays a very limited role, as competition through either individually negotiated 
labor contracts or alternative collective wage agreements is only slowly 
developing.
Collective bargaining and the right to form coalitions in the labor market are 
constitutionally protected in Germany by Article 9 of the German constitution 
(Grundgesetz). That means, as in many other countries (such as the USA), labor 
market cartels are legalized in Germany. Put differently, the labor market is 
exempted from competition law. The underlying idea is that workers need to be 
protected, as employers are assumed to have significantly more bargaining power 
so that they can and will impose unfavorable (and unfair) conditions upon their 
employees. Hence, the constitution allows for the formation of labor unions that 
ought to have some countervailing power. 
In addition, collective bargaining is regulated through the law concerning tariff 
agreements, the Tarifvertragsgesetz (TVG), which is the explicit legal basis of the 
ATS in Germany, and the law concerning corporate constitutions, the 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG), which regulates firm-level codetermination 
rights and proceedings. As we will discuss in the next section, various provisions 
in these two laws help stabilizing the ATS. 
5 For a detailed description of the ATS, its emergence, and its legal foundations, see 
PAULY [2005] and HAUCAP,P AULY AND WEY [2006]. 7
3   Cartel Stability 
While labor market cartels are exempted from competition law and legalized 
through the constitution in Germany, it is well known from economic theory that 
the pure authorization of a cartel is not sufficient for guaranteeing the cartel’s 
stability against either deviation by insiders or competition from outside (see 
SELTEN [1973] and PHLIPS [1995]). In fact, cartels are rarely stable if the number 
of market participants is very large, which is typically the case in most labor 
markets. Of course, this insight is by no means new (see LIEFMANN [1927], 
STIGLER [1964] or SELTEN [1973]), but it implies that the ATS cannot be a direct 
result of the constitutional freedom to form coalitions in the labor market alone. 
In theory, the ATS should be destabilized by incentives on both the employers’ 
and the employees’ side to undercut the collective tariff agreement. Quite 
generally, firms can improve their competitiveness by paying wage rates below 
the standard wage. Similarly, unemployed workers who are not able to find a job 
at the conditions negotiated under the ATS should rather prefer a low wage job 
over no job at all and, therefore, also accept job offers at wages below the 
centrally negotiated rate. Hence, consistently high unemployment rates in 
Germany and ever increasing international competition in almost all segments of 
the German economy should undermine the ATS. However, this is not quite yet 
the case: About 80 percent of all employer-employee-relationships are still 
directly or indirectly governed by tariff agreements concluded between industry 
unions and employers’ associations (see KOHAUT AND SCHNABEL [2007]). The 
answer to the question why labor market competition is only emerging so slowly 
is, of course, that the institutional framework governing the German labor market, 
first penalizes firms’ exit from the ATS, and second, rewards firms’ entry into the 
ATS, thereby stabilizing the wage cartel. We first summarize the legal provisions 
which provide incentives to abstain from exiting the ATS.
6
1. It is virtually impossible for a member firm of the employers’ 
association to negotiate a lower wage than the collectively negotiated 
industry-wide wage with non-unionized workers. A non-unionized 
worker cannot commit not to join the union after being hired (KISSEL
[2002, p. 46]). Therefore, a worker can always become a union 
member, in which case § 4 TVG requires the employer to immediately 
pay the tariff wage. Recognizing Germany’s restrictive "dismissal 
protection law" (Kündigungsschutzgesetz) and the "law regarding part-
time work and temporary labor contracts" (Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit 
und befristete Arbeitsverträge) we obtain the result that any 
discrimination between workers by a tariff bound employer is not a real 
option.
7
6 See HAUCAP,P AULY AND WEY [2006] for a more comprehensive analysis. 
7 There are additional reasons for the absence of discrimination between organized and 
non-organized workers: i) Industry-wide tariff agreements may provide for "outsider 
clauses" (Außenseiterklauseln) which require member firms not to discriminate; ii) works 
councils have a veto right concerning the hiring of new workers whenever this is 8
2. Termination of membership in the employers’ association in order to 
escape the ATS is made unattractive through the following provisions: 
First, the "continuity principle" (Fortgeltung) of § 3 (3) TVG bounds 
the employer to centrally negotiated agreements until these agreements 
are being re-newed or expire.
8 Second, the continuity principle does not 
only apply to the labor contracts that exist when the firm leaves the 
employers’ association, but also to all new labor contracts concluded 
within the life-span of the existing centrally negotiated agreements.
9
Third, the "right of continuance" (Nachwirkung), laid down in § 4 (5) 
TVG, constrains the deviating employer in re-writing its labor 
contracts, as all labor contracts concluded before the end of the 
continuity term have to adhere at least to the then valid tariff-conditions 
for an unlimited period of time.
10
3. Coverage extension rules can be employed to prevent employers from 
undercutting centrally negotiated tariff agreements even vis-à-vis non-
unionized workers.
11
4. The deviating firm looses its protection against strikes over the duration 
of the centrally negotiated tariff agreement, as the union’s "peace 
keeping duty” (Friedenspflicht) only applies to member firms of the 
employers’ association.
12
Hence, the short run gains of leaving the employers’ association in order to 
achieve a competitive advantage by negotiating lower wage contracts are virtually 
nil. We now turn to provisions which draw outsider firms into the ATS:  
1. The outsider cannot strike a collective agreement with a union other 
than the incumbent monopoly union. Given that an individual employer 
cannot negotiate a better deal than the employers’ association, the 
outside firm is left with the only remaining option to rely exclusively on 
individual contracting. In the latter case, the firm operates under the 
constant threat of a strike.
disadvantageous for the established workers already employed by the firm (§ 99 (2) 
BetrVG) or whenever this violates agreed hiring rules (§ 95 BetrVG) or equal treatment 
rules (§ 87(1) BetrVG); iii) firms may want to pay tariff wages "voluntarily" to non-
unionized workers in order to prevent them from becoming unionized. 
8 While wage-agreements typically do not last longer than two years, other non-wage-
agreements have a life-span of up to ten years. Some non-wage agreements about 
working conditions (so-called Manteltarifverträge) do not even specify an expiry date. 
9 Strictly speaking, after having terminated membership in the employer association, only 
new labor contracts with union members have to adhere to the tariff agreements which 
are in force. However, the scope for discrimination between organized and non-organized 
workers is quite small. 
10 The right of continuance does not apply when new workers are hired. 
11 For a description and analysis of coverage extension rules in Germany, see MEYER
[1992] and HAUCAP,P AULY AND WEY [2000], [2001] for an economic analysis. 
12 The deviant firm is also excluded from the strike insurance system (Gefahren-
gemeinschaft) which the employers’ associations provide for their member firms. 9
2. Application of coverage extension rules would require the outsider firm 
to pay the tariff wage anyway. 
A main question, however, remains: Why is there virtually no union 
competition so that firms outside the ATS cannot enter into collective agreement 
with a union other than the incumbent monopoly union? Following our previous 
analysis of the cartelizing effects of Germany’s labor laws we can identify, again, 
legal constraints that effectively restrict market entry of competing unions with 
the right to negotiate collective wage agreements (Tariffähigkeit); in particular:
13
1. "Interplant requirement”: The union must not only operate at one plant 
exclusively but it has to present workers’ interests at many plants.  
2. "Mightiness requirement”: The workers’ association must be mighty. 
According to the Federal Labor Court one indicator to evaluate a 
union’s "mightiness” is whether the union has already concluded 
collective wage agreements in the past. Moreover, the existence of a 
powerful incumbent union has been used as evidence that a new union 
is not mighty.
14
These requirements are a result of legal practice and the Federal labor court 
(Bundesarbeitsgericht) has developed a very restrictive interpretation that allowed 
the incumbents unions (organized in the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund) to 
challenge the union status of rival unions successfully in court (see FRANZEN
[2001, pp. 6–7]). Obviously, a new union can hardly refer to collective contracting 
in the past, as mightiness is a prerequisite for the legal right to conclude collective 
wage agreements. This means that a new union has to attempt to square the circle: 
The right to collective bargaining cannot be obtained without a union being 
sufficiently mighty, while one indicator for a union’s mightiness is it having 
concluded collective agreements in the past. The interplant requirement explicitly 
excludes a firm’s workforce (or an alternative organization such as the works 
council) from negotiating a collective agreement with their employer, even when 
the firm faces bankruptcy and a lower firm-specific wage would save the firm. 
Consequently, one can conclude that the existing legal practice virtually excludes 
the creation and appearance of any new union with the right to engage in 
collective bargaining (also see KISSEL [2002, p. 105] as well as LESCH [2006]).
In addition, five of the DGB member unions have merged into a single large 
union (verdi) in 2001. While some of the five unions were effectively competing 
before the merger due to overlapping competencies for some firms, the grand 
merger has not only further reduced actual competition between unions but also 
reduced the prospect for potential union competition within the current 
framework. At the same time, however, we have also seen the emergence of two 
13 See, e.g., REUTER [1995], RIEBLE [1996] and KISSEL [2002] for a full description of the 
requirements a tariff enabled union must fulfill according to legal practice.  
14  See HAUCAP,P AULY AND WEY [2006, pp. 366–367] for an account of labor court 
rulings against the Christliche Gewerkschaft Metall which is the only existing competitor 
of the IG Metall.10
new unions, which have grown out of former interest groups, such as Cockpit
(organizing pilots) or Marburger Bund (organizing physicians). Both unions only 
compete at the fringe with existing unions, however, as they organize workers 
which are complementary to other unionized workers, organized by the DGB, 
such as flight attendants and nurses. Hence, these new unions hardly compete with 
existing unions, but rather complement them. Accordingly, there is less resistance 
from established unions when compared to the formation of truly competing 
unions such as the Christliche Gewerkschaft Metall (CGM) which directly 
competes with the incumbent IG Metall.
To summarize, our analysis shows that on the one hand legal provisions make 
it less attractive for firms to leave the employers’ association, as the benefits of 
exit are reduced by law, and on the other hand there are costs of operating outside 
the ATS which, taken together, make exit from the ATS less attractive for firms 
and draw outsiders into the employers’ association. In addition, there are 
significant barriers to entry for new unions as it is extremely difficult for a new 
union to obtain the right to engage in collective bargaining. In consequence, there 
is very little competition between unions. 
4   Competition Policy in the Labor Market
One common (and steadily repeated) policy recommendation on how to reduce 
unemployment in Germany is to make wage rates more flexible so that local and 
firm-specific conditions can be reflected more accurately in the wage rates (see, 
e.g., DONGES [1992], OECD [1996], SIEBERT [1997] and SACHVERSTÄNDIGENRAT
[2002]). Put differently, it is suggested that wages should be allowed to differ to a 
greater extent between firms than today.  
Today tariff area agreements usually specify minimum standards and do not 
take into account firm specific conditions. Due to the principle of 
advantageousness (Günstigkeitsprinzip) there is no scope for agreeing on lower 
wage rates at the firm level.
15 Hence, most of the reform proposals aim at the 
"localization” of wage negotiations (see BAHNMÜLLER [2001]), which can, in 
principle, be implemented within the ATS through so-called opening clauses that 
may require the consent of central instances. In these cases, the central bargaining 
parties agree on wage corridors within which individual firms can deviate towards 
lower wage rates. The extent of firm specific wage differentiation, however, 
remains under the control of the labor market cartel, so that wage differentiation 
can be understood as being analogous to input price discrimination under 
monopoly. Less productive firms are expected to be granted wage concessions 
(lower wage rates) under this regime when compared to firms with higher 
productivity levels which will face higher wage demands. For the ATS, such rules 
have a stabilizing function as they allow for monopolistic wage discrimination, 
15 Tariff area agreements usually specify different wage rates for different qualifications. 
Hence, there is some limited scope for grouping employees into lower qualification 
classes, but this grouping is monitored by the firm’s works council. 11
and hence, help to prevent decentralized wage setting outside the labor market 
cartel’s control (i.e., the so-called Tarifflucht).
16
In contrast to flexibility reform proposals within the labor market cartel, 
alternative reform proposals call for the introduction of competition into the labor 
market by truly decentralizing wage negotiations. Interferences by central 
instances of the labor cartel are invalid under such a scenario, so that competition 
between independent union-employers relationships within the same industry 
would emerge. These reform proposals will reduce the involved parties’ market 
power and would imply a fundamental change of the German labor market 
framework. For example, the WISSENSCHAFTLICHE BEIRAT [2004] has proposed a 
strong version of an opening clause that features more wage-setting competencies 
for works councils. Quite clearly, such a proposal may have strong destabilizing 
effects as it would introduce the possibility of non-cooperative "best-response" 
strategies at the firm level, even if one allows for the fact that works councils are 
typically run by (union-trained) organized workers (which is, in turn, a result of 
the works council formation process as prescribed by the Betriebsverfassungs-
gesetz). Not surprisingly, such an ambitious proposal has not been implemented 
so far.
The important message is that introducing more "flexibility" into Germany’s 
labor market can have very different implications for the stability of the German 
labor cartel. While the introduction of flexibility within the ATS strengthens the 
bargaining parties’ market power vis-à-vis potential outside competitors, the 
introduction of true competition through decentralized bargaining reduces market 
power by facilitating market entry through market liberalization.
Since the German constitution guarantees the right to form coalitions and since 
collective bargaining saves transaction costs, the formation of collective labor 
unions cannot (and should not) be prevented altogether. This has also been 
recognized by legal scholars such as RIEBLE [1996, p. 540] who writes (translated 
by the authors): "A labor market competition order primarily has to regulate 
collective competition regarding tariffs and labor conflicts.”  
It is mainly outsider competition in the form of new unions who have to be 
protected against anticompetitive practices by the incumbent labor monopolist. As 
individual firms already have the right to negotiate collective wage agreements 
once they have left "their" employers’ association, competition on the employers’ 
side can slowly emerge, even if the continuity principle and the right of 
continuance are not removed. However, as explained above, it is extremely 
difficult for competing worker associations to obtain the right to negotiate 
collective wage agreements today. To facilitate competition between unions, 
especially the mightiness requirement and the interplant requirement described 
above need to be abolished to break the incumbent union’s market power. 
Therefore, labor market reforms that aim at introducing competitive collective 
bargaining have to deal with two related issues. Firstly, barriers to entry for new 
collective bargaining parties have to be removed. This includes the reduction of 
16 The effects of a flexibility policy within the ATS on employment and social welfare are 
ambiguous when compared with alternative structures of unionism (see HAUCAP AND 
WEY [2004]). 12
switching costs, i.e. firms and employees must be able to terminate existing 
agreements and conclude new ones. Secondly, once entry barriers have been 
removed, anticompetitive behavior by incumbent collective bargaining parties has 
to be prevented by appropriate measures. Incumbent monopolies and established 
cartels usually have the ability and also the incentives to drive new entrants off the 
market in order to prevent competition.
17 As SIMON [1944, p. 6] has put it quite 
bluntly in this context, "monopoly power must be abused. It has no use save 
abuse.”
Turning to the first point, there are a number of barriers for firms or alternative 
employers’ associations which prevent them from negotiating separate collective 
wage agreements. First, the principle of advantageousness and restrictions on 
works councils’ ability to engage in collective negotiations (§ 77 (3) 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) as well as continuation clauses (§3 (3) and § 4 (5) 
Tarifvertragsgesetz) make it unattractive to leave the ATS. Second, coverage 
extension rules (§ 5 (1) Tarifvertragsgesetz) and the absence of competing unions 
tend to draw outsiders into the ATS. On the union’s side the mightiness criterion 
and the interplant requirement need to be removed to facilitate competition 
between unions.
18
Regarding the second point, strike activities by incumbent unions need to be 
regulated with a competition policy perspective. As the history of labor market 
disputes reveals, strategic strikes were commonly used to discipline other 
workforces or firms that try to deviate from the labor market cartel.
19 The history 
of collective labor relations and cartelization more generally, teaches us that the 
main problem of introducing competition consists in the use of coercion, force 
and exclusionary arrangements so as to combat outside competition both by 
deviating employers and by rival unions (see, e.g., CHAMBERLIN [1964]). 
Currently, labor law is primarily tailored for the regulation of strike activity 
between central unions and central employers’ associations where competition 
between independent collective agreements is virtually absent. Therefore, 
regulations on strategic strike activities that aim at disciplining outsiders are 
(understandably, given the current system) not in force. Within the ATS, strikes 
serve to strengthen the union’s bargaining position in a bilateral bargaining game. 
In contrast, in a decentralized wage bargaining system strikes can also serve to 
discipline competing unions or deviating employers so that more strike activities 
17 It is well-known that the rent-seeking incentive of an incumbent monopolist may very 
well lead to much higher welfare losses than the mere exercise of monopoly power would 
suggest. While in the latter case the welfare loss is limited to the Harberger triangle, in 
the former case the entire present value of the monopoly profit stream is at stake (see, 
e.g., PHLIPS [1995]). 
18 At the individual level so-called yellow-dog contracts are illegal which would allow a 
worker to commit not to join the union after being hired. Quite obviously, together with 
Germany’s strict dismissal protection law, these rules deprive individuals from the 
opportunity to compete against the labor cartel. 
19 See, for example, Judge Pitney’s summary of the US Duplex case of 1913 documented 
in BERMAN [1930, p. 104]. 13
can be expected.
20 For example, so-called secondary strikes have been a common 
tactic of unions to harm competing outsiders in case of deviating behavior either 
by forcing boycotts of essential customers or suppliers. Interestingly, to our best 
knowledge, in Germany’s highly cartelized labor markets secondary strikes have 
not been used. A commonly held view among German labor lawyers is that 
secondary strikes are illegal. Needless to say, that there has also been no pressing 
need to apply such crude measures in Germany, and it remains to be seen how 
jurisprudence will deal with such activities in an environment that facilitates the 
emergence of decentralized, and hence, competing collective labor agreements.
21
Any policy proposal that tends to favor a break-up of the ATS has to go hand 
in hand with a proposal for an institutional framework that will deal with the 
unavoidable conflicts a decentralized and hence more competitive labor market 
system must provoke; as e.g., secondary strikes, picketing and forced boycotts by 
the dominant union to protect its monopoly power. To resolve such disputes in a 
way that allows to trade-off pro-union objectives and opposing antitrust rules an 
appropriate court system is needed.  
The current labor court system is, however, not well equipped to allow for such 
a more balanced approach. Labor court judges are nominated in close consultation 
with both incumbent monopoly unions and the employers’ associations (see 
PAULY [2005, p. 104 f.]), so that the "labor jurisdiction law" (Arbeitsgerichtsbar-
keitsgesetz) guarantees the influence of the labor cartel on labor courts’ 
composition. Moreover, labor courts’ strict orientation towards an unconditional 
support of monopoly unionism (as exemplified by its very restrictive approval of 
the union status) makes it unlikely that the current labor court system will protect 
outsider rights in an adequate way. As has been pointed out by POSNER [1984] for 
the National Labor Relations Board in the US that displaced the common law 
system there, the labor court system can be interpreted by its very existence to 
function as a major force in executing the stabilizing effects of the labor laws.  
The US case is also instructive for the realization of labor market policies that 
intend to strengthen competition, as union-employer contracts that aim at forcing 
other businesses to join the collective agreement may fall under the domain of 
antitrust laws (see SULLIVAN AND GRIMES [2000, pp. 716–727] for a delineation 
of the labor exemption in US antitrust law). The US case, therefore, highlights the 
role of competition policy to safeguard a more decentralized labor system by 
appropriate competition rules. Put differently, decentralizing labor market reforms 
need both: antitrust laws and an appropriate legal environment. 
20 Accordingly, POSNER [2003] concludes that the US labor law can be interpreted as a 
"peacemaker" that reduced the exercise of force – in particular, strikes, boycotts, and 
lockouts – by the collective bargaining parties.  
21 Recently, Germany’s most powerful industry union IG Metall has reverted to a tactic 
which comes close to a call for a secondary strike. Precisely, the IG Metall pushed hard to 
persuade employers to boycott a collective agreement between the Employers’ 
Association of Northern Bavarian Work Agencies (Interessengemeinschaft Nord-
bayerischer Zeitarbeitsunternehmen – INZ) and the Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund
(CGB). The respective collective agreement was banned by leading union official, 
Reinhard Dombre, as a "dirty trick with questionable associations" (see the official 
website of the DGB at http://www.dgb.de).14
5   Conclusions 
We have shown that standard cartel theory provides a consistent and parsimonious 
way to explain the functioning of the major labor institutions and the causes of 
uncontested union monopoly power in Germany. Those institutions serve to 
facilitate cartel agreements between industry unions and employers’ associations 
by effectively protecting the cartel against deviant behavior of insiders as well as 
from outsider competition, in particular, in the form of rival unions.  
We have argued that recent labor market reforms that intend to make the ATS 
more "flexible” can be split into stabilizing reforms (in particular, opening clause 
within the ATS) and reforms that introduce competition into the labor market. 
Only the former proposals have been politically successful so far, while truly 
liberalizing proposals have not been implemented. As the latter proposals have 
been lacking a vision of how to deal with the arising conflicts and disputes, such 
proposals are not really convincing for policy makers. Any attempt to introduce 
competition into the German labor market must come with a convincing answer to 
the question of how to deal with the arising re-monopolizing strategies (in 
particular, strikes and the use of force as well as exclusionary arrangements). 
From this perspective, the current labor court system appears to be a major barrier 
to change. It should be displaced by a new jurisdiction that trades off the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to form labor coalitions against the adverse 
effects that cartels and abuse of monopoly power must evoke. In short: A more 
reasonable approach within the legal labor market environment is desperately 
needed.
Moreover, we have distinguished between two kinds of labor market 
liberalization strategies: Firstly, some policies directly aim at breaking up the 
existing ATS by making deviant behavior of insiders more attractive, while, 
secondly, other reform proposals allow for new options of collective agreements 
among outsiders, while leaving the status quo of the cartel participants untouched. 
Most proposals fall into the first category. For example, strong opening clauses 
and the attenuation of the advantageousness principle within the ATS would 
facilitate deviant behavior by cartel insiders. The same holds for the suggestion to 
enable works councils to conclude collective labor contracts, again, within the 
ATS. Similar effects emanate from proposals that soften continuation clauses and 
the dismissal protection law. It is not surprising that all those proposals have 
received a maximum of political opposition and have, accordingly, not been 
implemented. If, however, policy proposals that fall into the second category gain 
momentum, then the liberalization of Germany’s labor market can be achieved 
without a brute force approach that aims at breaking up the cartel directly.
22 New 
options for firms and workers outside the existing ATS can be created through the 
removal of existing entry barriers for the establishment of a fully tariff-enabled 
22 While we did not analyze recent trends in the temporary work market in Germany, we 
feel that liberalization appears to be quite successful here, exactly because a new market
has been unlocked by liberalizing laws (see Footnote 1) so that vested interests, and 
hence, political opposition were presumably minimal in that case. 15
union. Political opposition against new options should be smaller when compared 
to other proposals, as the creation of such options for outsiders comes closer to a 
Pareto improvement (at least in the short run when we abstract from competition 
effects). This should, by definition, reduce the incumbent labor cartel’s protests. 
In the longer run, new options outside the ATS will also provide additional 
incentives for insider firms to leave the ATS so that the German labor cartel may 
very well vaporize in the future.
23
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